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GENERIC PRODUCT RISKS: THE CASE AGAINST 
COMMENT k AND FOR STRICT TORT LIABILITY 
JOSEPH A. pAGE* 
Projc"or Page con<ider; whether strict liability should be imposed for injuries caused by prod-
uct.\ that po1e generic ri>ks-ri.sks that do not derive from flaws in the manufacturing process but 
from product de~gn or from the cerr; nature of the product. He review.\ the ALI debate that 
preceded adoption of 'ection 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and finds the ambiguous 
meaning of comment k. which deals with ··unacoidably unsafe .. products, of little me in 
determining u-hcther >Cction 402A applies to generic product ri.sks. After examining the policy 
j!t>tijication< for impo~ng strict liability in c~es incolcing design dejects and construction 
d(ject<, Projc"or Page concludes that, at least in cases int'olving generic product risks that were 
unknou'n at the time of 1ale. strict liability .should be imposed as a modest incentive to 
manujactureTI to improve product safety and as a means of satisft;ing justifiable consumer 
expectation>. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent litigation involving asbestos 1 and DES 2 has attracted 
widespread interest, not only because of the staggering numbers of 
claimants alleging serious harm from these products3 and the filing of 
a bankruptcy petition by the nation's largest asbestos manufacturer, 4 
but also because of the complexity of the issues that the cases involve. 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., 1955, LL.B., 1958, LL.M., 
1964, Harvard University. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Peter J. Cinquegrani, Class of 1984, 
Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 Asbestos has been implicated as a cause of asbestosis, lung cancer, mesothelioma (a cancer 
of the chest or abdominal lining), and various forms of gastrointestinal cancers. See Hazards of 
Asbestos El>;posure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism 
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-11 (1982) (testimony of 
Dr. Irving Selikoff, Environmental Science Laboratory, Mt. Sinai Medical Center) [hereinafter 
Asbestos Hearings]. 
2 DES, or diethylstilbestrol, is a synthetic estrogen that was prescribed routinely to preg-
nant women to prevent miscarriages. The Food and Drug Administration approved DES in 
1947. In 1971 the drug was linked to a form of vaginal cancer in the daughters of women to 
whom it was administered. For a discussion of this history, see generally Payton v. Abbott Labs., 
512 F. Supp. 1031, 1032-34 (D. Mass. 1981); Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of 
Enterprise Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 963, 963-68 (1978). 
3 It has been estimated that nine million American workers were exposed to asbestos during 
the 1940's and 1950's. See Asbestos Hearings, supra note I, at 3 (testimony of Dr. Irving Selikoff). 
Estimates of the number of women who ingested DES range from three to four million. See 
Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 668, 
668 n. 7 (1981). 
• On August 26, 1982, Manville Corporation, the largest producer of asbestos in the western 
world, filed a petition for reorganization under the federal bankruptcy code. The company cited 
the projected cost of mounting asbestos litigation as the major reason for its filing a bankruptcy 
petition. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at AI, col. 6; Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at I, col. 6. 
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For example, many DES claimants, daughters of women who took the 
drug during pregnancy, are unable to identify the maker of the partic-
ular pills consumed by their mothers. The courts have had to decide 
whether to depart from traditional causation rules that would require 
directed verdicts for defendants, and if so, what new rules to adopt. 5 
In the asbestos cases, courts have had to determine the obligations of 
successive insurers to indemnify asbestos manufacturers against claims 
made by persons who allegedly contracted respiratory diseases from 
continuous exposure to asbestos over many years. 6 In addition to these 
problems, an array of legal theories asserted against an array of 
defendants who do not manufacture asbestos or DES has emerged in 
these cases. 7 
The few courts reaching the merits of claims made by asbestos 
and DES victims have, for the most part, refused to venture beyond 
the familiar confines of negligence law. Giving dispositive weight to 
5 Courts have reached opposite conclusions about whether plaintiffs who cannot identify 
the specific manufacturer of the drug to which they were exposed may recover. Compare Sinddl 
v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 16:3 Cal. Rptr. 1:32. 144-4Ei 
(recovery allowed under theory of market share liability), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); 
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 567-69, 420 A.2d 1305, 1314-16 (La\\' Div. 
1980) (recovery allowed under "alternative liability" theory); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 
N. Y.2d 571, 584-85, 436 N.E.2d 182, 188-89, 450 N. Y.S.2d 776, 782-83 (1982) (recon·ry allowed 
under "concert of action" theory) with Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp .. 593, 596-600 
(M.D. Fla. 1982) (recovery denied); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596-97 (D.S.C. 
1981) (same); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1039-40 (D. Mass. 1981) (same). Sincl' 
federal courts hear product liability cases only under diversity jurisdiction, each of the abow 
district courts applied the appropriate state law. For a state court refusing to rela'l. the traditional 
requirement that a plaintiff identify the defendant who actually caused the harm, see Payton\'. 
Abbot Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188-90 (Mass. 1982). 
6 Some courts have adopted a theory under which all companies that insured an asbestos 
firm during the period a claimant was exposed would contribute to the defense of the suit and to 
the satisfaction of an adverse judgment. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 
1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (adopting "exposure" theory of liability), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1007 (1982); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 63:3 
F.2d 1212, 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). For a decision 
requiring defense and indemnification only from the insurance company that covered the 
asbestos firm at the time the claimant's disease manifested itself, see Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 115-17 (D. Mass. 1981) (adopting "manifestation" 
theory of liability), modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982). 
7 See, e.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.) (action against 
manufacturer of respirator that failed to prevent asbestos-related disease), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1109 (1981); Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 525 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Va. 1979) (indemnity 
action by asbestos manufacturer against the United States as third-party defendant in suit b} 
injured worker), affd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981); 
Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (battery action against hospital 
for experimental use of DES). 
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section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes 
strict liability for "any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user," 8 and to comment k of section 402A, which 
recognizes an exception to strict liability for products deemed "un-
avoidably unsafe," 9 these courts in effect have required plaintiffs to 
establish that defendants engaged in unreasonable conduct. Under 
this analysis, if the benefits of a product outweigh its known risks, and 
if the manufacturer has provided suitable warnings and directions for 
use, the defendant's product will be deemed reasonably safe, and the 
plaintiff will not recover. 10 Similarly, if the manufacturer has placed 
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) provides in full: 
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change 
in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965) provides in full: 
Unar;oidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of 
human !..'llowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary 
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the 
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious 
and damaging consquences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a 
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwith-
standing the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly 
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, 
many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under 
the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental 
drug> as to which, became of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical e.'>.-peri-
ence, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but 
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a 
medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that 
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given where the situa-
tion calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending 
their rue, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently 
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk. 
(emphasis in original). 
1
" See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973) 
('" ... even when such a balancing leads to the conclusion that marketing is justified, the seller 
still has a responsibility to inform the user or consumer of the risk. The failure to give adequate 
warnings in such circumstances can render the product unreasonably dangerous." (citing com-
ment k)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 
576, 420 A.2d 1305, 1318 (Law Div. 1980) (comment k rules "are not strict liability rules at all. 
They are merely rules of negligence embodying the long-standing concepts of a lack of due care 
and foreseeability of the risk."). 
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the product into the stream of commerce without knowledge of the 
dangers associated with its use or consumption, courts typically have 
refused to impose liability unless the exercise of reasonable care would 
have uncovered the hazards. 11 One notable exception to this trend is a 
recent decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court, holding that an 
asbestos producer might be strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by 
risks that were unknown despite reasonable investigation at the time 
of sale. 12 
The reluctance of courts to impose strict liability in toxic-product 
cases corresponds to a trend, reflected in scholarly musings 13 and 
adopted in recent congressional reform efforts, 14 to limit strict liability 
to product defects attributable to the construction or manufacturing 
process. With respect to claims alleging inadequate product design, 
warnings, or instructions for use, the proponents of this limitation 
would apply a negligence test, either expressly or in a disguised form. 
Although the desirability of imposing strict liability upon the 
pharmaceutical industry for adverse drug reactions has been de-
bated, 15 the larger issue of whether all manufacturers should be held 
liable without fault for other types of toxic adverse effects of their 
products largely has escaped scrutiny. Since courts in a number of 
jurisdictions may soon be addressing the merits of asbestos and DES 
cases, a fresh look at the subject seems in order. 
The central focus of this Article is whether all "generic product 
risks" should be treated alike. The Article first will discuss the various 
types of generic risks-avoidable and unavoidable, known and un-
known-including those risks associated with toxic products like as-
11 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir. 197:3) 
("A product must not be made available to the public without disclosure of those dangers that the 
application of reasonable foresight would reveal."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Hender-
son, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 919, 924 (1981). 
12 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 209, 447 A.2d 539, 546 (1982). 
13 See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence to Warranty to 
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1980); Powers, The Persistence of Fault in 
Products Liability, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 777 (1983). 
14 SeeS. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5, 6, 129 Cong. Rec. S285 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) 
(strict liability for unreasonably dangerous construction or manufacture; fault-based liability for 
unreasonably dangerous design or failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions); S. 26:31, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 Cong. Rec. $6846 (daily ed. June 16, 1982) (virtually identical 
predecessor version of S. 44). 
15 See generally McClellan, Tate & Eaton, Strict Liability for Prescription Drug Injuries: 
The Improper Marketing Theory, 26 St. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1981); Merrill, Compensation for 
Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1973); Pratt & Parron, Diagnosis of a Legal 
Headache: Liability for Unforeseeable Defects in Drugs, 5:3 St. John's L. Rev. 517 (1979); Note, 
The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 
Fordham L. Rev. 735 (1980). 
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bestos and DES. 16 It will then argue that section 402A of the Restate-
ment and its comments provide little guidance in deciding cases that 
involve generic risks, and should not be accorded dispositive weight in 
product liability suits. The Article will then examine and evaluate the 
policy justifications for adopting a rule of strict tort liability in cases 
involving generic risks. Ultimately, the Article will conclude that a 
persuasive case can be made for imposing strict liability on manufac-
turers whose products contain unknown generic risks. 
I 
THE NATURE OF PRODUCT RISKS 
Risks attributable to flaws or impurities caused by the manufac-
turing process usually are present only in a small percentage of the 
units of a particular product and do not endanger every consumer of 
the product. Such product risks are nongeneric in nature. The pres-
ence of a foreign substance in a jar of mayonnaise and a malfunction 
in a television set due to poor workmanship exemplify this category of 
hazards. In contrast, asbestos and DES share a common characteris-
tic: the capacity to create risks that endanger, but do not necessarily 
harm, every user or consumer of the product. Such product risks are 
generic in nature. 
This Article will focus on generic product risks, of which there 
are two main types. One includes design risks, or risks that can be 
eliminated or at least reduced by changing the design of the product. 
For instance, the interior of an automobile can be made more 
crashworthy so that the occupant is more likely to survive a collision. 
Some design risks, however, may be impossible to eliminate or to 
reduce without frustrating the purpose for which the product is mar-
keted. The sharpness of a knife, the heat of a stove, and the physical 
force generated by an automobile are examples of this type of risk. 
These hazards enable the products to do what they were meant to do; 
they are essential to the function of the product and cannot be de-
signed away. 
The hazards associated with toxic products like asbestos and DES 
represent the second main type of generic risk. The manufacturers of 
asbestos products and DES have no desire to create the hazards associ-
ated with their products because these hazards serve no useful pur-
pose. Unlike the capacity of a knife to cut, which is essential to its 
intended use, the capacity of DES to cause cancer in the daughters of 
1
'' Although generic risks associated with toxic products like asbestos and DES are but one 
type of generic risk, these products represent a particularly important type of generic risk. 
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mothers who used the drug is irrelevant to the effectiveness of the 
drug; while the cutler consciously designs the cutting edge of a knife, 
the pharmaceutical company does not intentionally create the risk of 
cervical cancer. Toxic product risks are inherent in the nature of the 
product, 17 regardless of its design, and cannot be eliminated, at least 
given the current state of scientific knowledge, by any means short of 
withdrawing the product from the market. 18 
Other examples of generic, nondesign risks abound: adverse reac-
tions to drugs and exposure to harmful chemicals; 19 the risk of cancer 
from smoking cigarettes; 20 the risk of "toxic shock" from using tam-
pons; 21 and the possibly deleterious effects of consuming food and 
beverages containing saccharin22 and caffeine, 23 if these substances 
were someday linked conclusively to diseases in humans. 
As the saccharin and caffeine examples suggest, different types of 
generic risks, whether designed into a product or inherent in its na-
ture, may also be distinguished by the degree of existing knowledge 
about them. Some generic risks, such as the risk of cancer from 
smoking cigarettes, are well known to manufacturers and consumers 
alike. Other generic risks, such as the carcinogenic effects of DES, 
were unknown when the consumer was exposed to them. Still others, 
such as the possible side effects of caffeine, remain unknown today. 
17 Nongeneric risks may also be inherent in a component part of a product. Indeed. it was a 
flawed wooden spoke on the wheel of a 1910 Buick that gave birth to modern product liability 
law. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1060 (1916) (Cardozo, J.). 
18 In some instances, manufacturers can minimize the generic risks associated with their to:l.ic 
products by providing consumers and users with warnings and instructions. For example, drug 
producers can warn users who might suffer allergic reactions, and asbestos producers can 
instruct users to use protective masks when installing asbestos insulation. \Varnings and instruc-
tions can be used effectively, of course, only with respect to hazards that are known to exist. 
19 Representative recent cases involving these risks include Stiles v. Union Carbide Corp., 
520 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (vinyl chloride); Gutowski v. M & R Plastics & Coatin~s. 
Inc., 60 Mich. App. 499, 231 N.W.2d 456 (1975) (tolylenede-isocyanates); Peterson v. Bc·ndix 
Home Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1982) (formaldehyde). 
20 Representative cigarette-cancer cases include Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 
97 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970) (prior appeals reported in 325 F.2d 673 (5th 
Cir. 1963); 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962)); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 
479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966) (prior appeal reported in 295 F.2d 292 (3d 
Cir. 1961)); Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 
u.s. 865 (1963). 
21 See Lampshire v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 94 F.R.D. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1982). For a descrip-
tion of toxic-shock syndrome, see Robertson, Toxic Shock, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1982, ~ 6 
(Magazine), at 30. 
22 For a discussion of the dangers of saccharin use, see, e.g., The Banning of Saccharin, 1977: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on 
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91-97 (1977) (testimony of Donald S. Fredrickson, 
Director, National Institutes of Health). 
23 For a discussion of the possible dangers of caffeine use, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1982, at 
C1, col. I. 
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This Article discusses whether or not these various generic prod-
uct risks-designed-in and inherent, known and unknown-should be 
treated alike for purposes of applying strict liability. Should the rights 
of a plaintiff whose hand is burned by a hot stove or whose eye is 
injured because a machine tool lacks a safety device be determined by 
the same theory of liability that determines the rights of a plaintiff 
disabled by exposure to toxic asbestos fibres or DES? Should the claim 
of a patient harmed by an adverse side effect known to be associated 
with a drug be governed by the same theory of liability as is the claim 
of a patient injured by an adverse side effect that was unknown at the 
time the drug was administered? The light shed on these questions by 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which has greatly influenced the 
development of product liability doctrine, is an appropriate starting 
point. 
II 
GENERIC PRODUCT RisKS AND THE REsTATEMENT 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts24 gave impetus 
to a profound and far-reaching change in the law of product liability. 
It subjected sellers, including manufacturers, of all products to strict 
liability and grounded the cause of action in tort rather than war-
ranty.25 This change was important because a warranty cause of 
action was contractual in nature and was being preempted by the 
Uniform Commercial Code.26 More importantly, this change relieved 
plaintiffs of the need to establish a privity-of-contract relationship 
with defendants. This so-called "citadel of privity," preventing plain-
tiffs from asserting breach of warranty against defendants with whom 
they were not in privity, already had almost totally collapsed in 
warranty cases involving products for internal human consumption, 
and was crumbling under the onslaught of plaintiffs injured by manu-
factured goods.27 The widespread judicial adoption of section 402A 
24 See note 8 supra. 
25 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment m (1965). 
~" The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes an implied warranty of merchantability run-
ning with the sale of goods, under which the goods must be fit for the ordinary purposes for 
which they are sold. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). By 1965, the Uniform Commercial Code had 
been adopted in over 40 jurisdictions. See J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 5 
(1972). 
27 The classic articles on the demise of the privity requirement were both written by Dean 
Prosser. He first wrote Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 
69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960). Several years later, he finished the story. See Prosser, The Fall of the 
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser II]. 
860 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 58:853 
completed the demolition 28 and seemed at the time to be the most 
dramatic aspect of the new rule. 
This doctrinal revolution was remarkably swift. What began in 
1958 as a modest proposal for strict tort liability for the sale of food "in 
a condition dangerous to the consumer,"29 was extended three years 
later to cover "other products for intimate bodily use" in a "defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer." 30 By 1964, the 
final form of section 402A applied to "any product." 31 This expansion 
of the strict liability rule, however, was not accompanied by a thor-
ough analysis of the implications of bringing new classes of products 
within the sweep of section 402A. As a result, the Restatement does 
not adequately address the issues raised by generic risks. 
A. The Restatement Generally 
When the drafters of the Restatement broadened the scope of 
section 402A to cover all manufactured goods, they apparently as-
sumed that the doctrine and explanatory comments, which had been 
developed for food and other products "for intimate bodily use," 
would apply equally well to all manufactured goods. The final version 
of the section and its comments, therefore, remained virtually in-
tact. 32 
In retrospect, the most significant impact of this rush to strict 
liability was the confusion and uncertainty that subsequently plagued 
product-design litigation. Although the concept of design defective-
ness was not unknown in 1964,33 the proponents of section 402A saw 
no need to adjust the rules to determine explicitly when the new 
doctrine would impose strict liability for design defects. They retained 
the terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" 34 and added the 
requirement that the product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond 
28 Forty-four states have adopted some form of strict liability based upon § 402A. See J. 
Beasley, Products Liability and the Unreasonably Dangerous Requirement xii-xiii, 97-100 
(1981). 
29 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961). 
30 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). 
31 Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). This version was finally 
enacted. For other reviews of this evolution, see J. Beasley, supra note 28, at 21-2.3: \Vade, On 
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830-31 (1973). 
32 Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A comments a-m (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962) 
(coverage limited to food and products for intimate bodily use) with Restatement (Second) of 
Torts§ 402A comments a-m (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) (coverage extended to all products. with 
virtually no change in wording of comments). 
33 For an early recognition of this concept, see Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or 
Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816 (1962). 
34 Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A (1965). 
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that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer." 35 In 
subsequent years, courts and commentators alike have found this 
formulation inadequate and have struggled in vain to fashion an 
acceptable test for strict liability in product-design cases. 36 
Although the issue of design defectiveness was not recognized as a 
problem during the evolutionary stages of section 402A, certain other 
generic risks did occupy the attention of Dean William E. Prosser (the 
Reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), his advisers (the 
American Law Institute Council), and the American Law Institute 
("ALI") membership. In working out the new rule of strict liability, 
they were cognizant of the controversy over the causal relationship 
between cigarette smoking and cancer, as well as of the incidence of 
serious harm attributed to certain drugs and vaccines, 37 and consid-
ered whether the tobacco and pharmaceutical industries should be 
subject to strict liability.38 In their floor debates, Dean Prosser and 
members of the ALI also considered how whiskey would fit into their 
scheme of liability. 39 
With respect to cigarette-cancer litigation, the Restatement came 
out unequivocally on the side of the tobacco companies. During a 
1961 floor debate on section 402A, a motion was made to delete the 
word "defective" on the ground that the "unreasonably dangerous" 
requirement was an adequate test for determining when strict liability 
should apply and that therefore the term "defective condition" consti-
tuted excess baggage. 40 In response to this motion, Dean Prosser 
pointed out that the ALI Council wanted to retain the element of 
defectiveness in order to insulate from liability the sellers of dangerous 
products, such as whiskey, cigarettes, and certain drugs, which are 
3
'• Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1965). 
3
" Citations to the extensive literature and to a sampling of judicial decisions dealing with the 
test for liability in design-defect cases may be found in Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground 
Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice 
in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 521, 521 n.1 (1982). 
37 These products are mentioned specifically in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
comments i, k (1965). See also text accompanying notes 40-44, 54-61 infra. Indeed, appellate 
opinions involving these products already had appeared. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers 
Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (cigarettes); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. 
App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960) (polio vaccine). 
" See text accompanying notes 40-43 infra. When the ALI was making this decision, early 
drafts of § 402A applied only to food and to products for intimate bodily use. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts§ 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). Although it is impossible to know for certain, 
the fact that manufactured goods were excluded from the sweep of § 402A may have affected the 
drafters' thinking about generic hazards. 
31 American Law Institute, 38th Annual Meeting: Proceedings 87-88 (1962) [hereinafter ALI 
Proceedings]. 
•u Id. at 87. The motion was made by Professor Reed Dickerson. 
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inherently dangerous even though there is nothing "wrong" with 
them. 41 The specter of alcoholics bringing a barrage of suits against 
distillers apparently haunted the drafters of section 402A. 42 After a 
very brief discussion, the motion was defeated by a voice vote, and the 
"defective condition" standard remained a part of section 402A. 43 
The notion that section 402A would apply only to defective 
products-products that have something wrong with them other than 
their inherent danger-would seem to exclude most generic risks. It is 
not clear, however, that this interpretation is what the majority of the 
ALI had in mind. During the 1961 debate, Dean Prosser agreed with 
other members that the "unreasonably dangerous" standard was suffi-
cient to protect sellers of products such as cigarettes and whiskey. 44 In 
41 Id. at 87-88. 
42 As Dean Prosser noted during the 1961 floor debate, " 'Defective' was put in to head off 
liability on the part of the seller of whiskey, on the part of the man who consumes it and gets 
delirium tremens, even though the jury might find that all whiskey is unreasonably dangerous to 
the consumer." Id. at 88. \Vhat the drafters never realized, however, was that the cure, 
retaining the requirement of a defect, ultimately would prove worse than the disease. 
Judge Goodrich, in his concurring opinion in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 
295 F.2d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 1961), was the first to link cigarettes and whiskey. This linkage is 
more lyric than logical. This imagery suggests a no-liability conclusion in search of a rationale 
rather than a result dictated either by doctrine or principle. An apparent zeal to exonerate the 
tobacco industry from strict liability produced the following giddy pronouncement: "Good 
tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; 
but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous." Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1965). 
In arguing that the manufacturer of cigarettes that cause cancer should not be liable for 
breach of implied warranty (absent some representation that the product is harmless), Judge 
Goodrich invoked the whiskey analogy and noted that"'[ e]verybody knows that the consumption 
of intoxicating beverages may cause several different types of physical harm." 295 F.2d at 302. 
He went on to assert that there would be no liability for over-consumption of whiskey "unless (1) 
the manufacturer tells the customer the whiskey will not hurt him or (2) the whiskey is 
adulterated whiskey." Id. The analogy does not really apply. Plaintiffs in cigarette-cancer cases 
do not seek damages for harm resulting from excessive or abusive smoking but rather from 
ordinary smoking over a prolonged period of time. This is the very type of consumption sought 
by the tobacco companies. Sellers of whiskey, on the other hand, do not overtly encourage the 
type of over-consumption that causes the harm to which Judge Goodrich adverted. 
In addition, Judge Goodrich stated that "(i]f the defendant here takes the position that 
nobody knows whether cigarettes cause cancer or not but at the same time asserts to buyers that 
•.. cigarettes do not cause cancer, it is in difficulty if a customer shows that the use of these 
cigarettes caused cancer in him." Id. The problem he never addresses is whether liability should 
attach when the seller of cigarettes says nothing to the buyer about the risk of cancer, which is 
unknown to both buyer and seller, and the risk later materializes. Reference to the O\'er-
consumption of whiskey obscures rather than informs his analysis. 
In 1961 Judge Goodrich was the Executive Director of the ALI and had participated in the 
Council discussion to which Dean Prosser referred. See text accompanying note 41 supra; \'\'ade, 
supra note 31, at 830 n.23. 
43 See ALI Proceedings, supra note 39, at 89. 
44 Id. ("I thought 'unreasonably dangerous' ... carried every meaning that was neces-
sary .... "). 
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drafting comment i to section 402A, he pointed out that many prod-
ucts, including food and drugs, involve "some risk of harm, if only 
from over-consumption," but this risk did not render such products 
"unreasonably dangerous." Dean Prosser concluded that the proper 
test was whether the product was "dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who pur-
chases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as 
to its characteristics."45 Thus defined, the requirement of unreasona-
ble danger would not be met in cases involving whiskey, the hazards 
of which are known universally, but might be met in cigarette cases, 
depending upon the court's determination of what the ordinary con-
sumer knew about the risks of smoking at the time of marketing. 46 
Toxic risks are not necessarily excluded, therefore, from section 402A. 
Another way to approach the scope of section 402A is to ask 
whether a product with any kind of generic risk, which was found to 
be unreasonably dangerous, would meet the separate requirement of 
defectiveness. The comments to section 402A do not answer this ques-
tion. Comment i presents examples that shed little light upon the 
problem. The examples contrast generic risks that are not considered 
unreasonable ("good" whiskey that makes some people drunk, "good" 
tobacco that causes harm, "good" butter that deposits cholesterol in 
the blood and leads eventually to heart attacks) with those that do 
present unreasonable dangers attributable to defects in the same prod-
ucts (whiskey contaminated with a dangerous amount of fusel oil, 
tobacco with marijuana, butter with poisonous fish oil). 47 The former 
pose dangers widely known to the ordinary consumer; 48 the latter 
present clear instances of something "wrong" with the product. Nei-
ther group of examples presents a product, not otherwise defective, 
with such unreasonable risks that strict liability ought to apply. 
Comment g, elaborating upon the concept of "defective condi-
tion," is similarly unhelpful. It limits strict liability to situations where 
••the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition 
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreason-
ably dangerous to him." 49 The word ··condition," like the contami-
·~ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1965). 
«1 Studies linking smoking and cancer began emerging in the 1940's. See Pritchard v. Liggett 
& Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 1961). Modern consumers, therefore, know a 
great deal more about the risks of smoking than did previous generations. The hazards might 
well now be considered "universally known." 
47 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1965). 
49 This conclusion is based, of course, on a factual finding that cigarettes and butter are 
harmful. 
4
'' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g (1965) (emphasis added). 
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nated product examples, seems to suggest that there must be some-
thing "wrong" with the product beyond any inherent capacity to 
cause harm. 
Yet Dean Prosser and the ALI did not intend to exclude from 
section 402A all products creating generic risks. Comment j states that 
warnings may be required for "poisonous drugs or those unduly dan-
gerous for other reasons" 5° (categories broad enough to embrace medi-
cines triggering deleterious reactions), a proposition compelling the 
conclusion that the failure to include such warnings might subject the 
manufacturer to strict liability. While the comment specifies that the 
absence of directions or warnings may render the product unreason-
ably dangerous, it does not explain whether unreasonably dangerous 
also means that the drug is in a "defective condition.'' 51 Does com-
ment k shed any light on the meaning of "defective"? 
B. The Meaning of Comment k 
Comment k, dealing with so-called "unavoidably unsafe prod-
ucts," is more expansive than these other comments. It declares that a 
drug with proper directions and warnings would be neither defective 
nor unreasonably dangerous, 52 thus suggesting that the same charac-
teristic (mislabeling) that made the drug unreasonably dangerous 
might also make it defective. This wording blurs the distinction be-
tween the two elements, and the requirement of a defect thus becomes 
superfluous. 53 
The genesis of comment k may help explain this blurring and 
comment k's other mysteries. Dean Prosser drafted the comment in 
response to a proposal at the 1961 ALI meeting that prescription drugs 
50 I d. comment j. 
51 Id. In an article written after he drafted this comment, Dean Prosser indicated that a drug 
marketed without warnings of dangers, which consumers would not already know about, would 
be regarded as "defective."' See Prosser II, supra note 27, at 801. 
52 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (196.5). The text of comment k, 
which emphasizes the word "unreasonably," is reprinted in note 9 supra. 
53 See Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 645, 
649-50 (1967). For judicial recognition of this point, see Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 94:3, 
947 (5th Cir. 1968) ("When ... the product is [manufactured] exactly as intended by the 
manufacturer, to speak in terms of a 'defect" only causes confusion .... The key ... is whether 
the product is 'unreasonably dangerous.'"'); Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., 569 S.W.2d 571, 
577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) ("one who sells a nondefective unreasonably dangerous product 
without communicating the dangerousness of the product ... is liable for the injuries inflicted 
by the unreasonably dangerous item"'); Little v. PPG Indus., 92 Wash. 2d l18, 121, 594 P.2d 
911, 913 (1979) ("(I)t is inaccurate to speak of a properly manufactured but necessarily danger-
ous product as being in a 'defective' condition .... [I]t is more appropriate to describe an article 
bearing an inadequate warning as 'unreasonably dangerous' than as 'defective.'"). 
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be specifically excluded from section 402A. 54 The arguments and the 
discussion that followed were notably unfocused. The motion under 
consideration failed to distinguish between harm from adverse reac-
tions and other kinds of drug-induced harm, such as that caused by 
improper formulation or toxic ingredients. 55 Since no one could argue 
seriously that the latter risks should escape strict liability, the failure 
to separate the two categories muddled the debate. Moreover, neither 
Dean Prosser nor the ALI member who made the proposal indicated 
how he thought section 402A would apply to prescription drugs in the 
absence of an explicit exemption. A solution was being offered for a 
problem that never had been clearly defined. Nor were adverse reac-
tions about which warnings had been issued at the time of marketing 
distinguished from other harmful effects not discovered until later. 
There was also disagreement over the scope of the proposed 
exemption. The motion proposed to insulate all prescription drugs 
from strict tort liability.56 Dean Prosser suggested that a better case 
could be made for excluding "relatively new, experimental, and un-
certain drugs, of which there are a great many on the market, and 
justifiably so." 57 He defined the term "experimental drug" to include 
virtually all prescription drugs and even some over-the-counter medi-
cines. 58 Dean Prosser's use of the adjective "experimental" went far 
beyond clinical testing, an initial stage of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA") approval process, and covered drugs that had com-
pleted the entire approval process and had been marketed to con-
sumers. 59 Thus, he was suggesting an exemption even broader than 
that proposed by the motion. 60 The motion to include an exemption 
"' See ALI Proceedings, supra note 39, at 90-92. Harold B. Gross of New York City made the 
motion. 
~~ Dean Prosser, criticizing the motion, observed that a pharmacist who supplies poisoned 
epsom salts clearly should be liable to the injured consumer. Id. at 92. 
"" Id. at 90, 97. 
" Id. at 93. Dean Prosser's assertion that a great many experimental and uncertain drugs 
were justifiably on the market, offered ex cathedra and without documentation, was a debatable 
one at best. See generally M. Mintz, The Therapeutic Nightmare (1965); M. Shapo, A Nation of 
Guinea Pigs: The Unknown Risks of Chemical Technology (1979). If the assertion stands as a 
basis for comment k, it demonstrates strikingly the weakness of the Restatement drafting process 
as a mechanism for resolving policy issues. 
" ALI Proceedings, supra note 39, at 96. Dean Prosser also saw a need to treat "experimental 
foods" in a similar fashion. Id. at 94. For an argument against exempting new and experimental 
foods from strict liability, see Comment, Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unforeseeable Risks in Manu-
facturers' Liability Under Implied Warranty, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 533 (1963). 
"'' Clinical testing is a prerequisite for FDA approval of a new drug. For a description of the 
process by which the FDA approves new drugs, see generally 1 J. O'Reilly, Food and Drug 
Administration ch. 13 (1982). This approval process helps to insure that information about some 
risk~ associated with the approved drugs becomes known after widespread and long-term use. 
''' The only other member to speak on the issue besides Dean Prosser, Donald J. Farage of 
Philadelphia, opposed any exemption. See ALI Proceedings, supra note 39, at 97. 
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for prescription drugs in section 402A ultimately was defeated, 61 as 
was a subsequent motion to insert such an exception in the com-
ments. 62 On its face, this defeat did not seem to reflect a desire by the 
membership to exclude more than prescription drugs from section 
402A, but Dean Prosser apparently saw things differently. 
Reflecting the murkiness of its origins, the version of comment k 
that emerged from the Reporter's hand failed to delineate in any 
meaningful way either the breadth of its coverage or its purpose. The 
comment first addresses "unavoidably unsafe products, .. which it de-
fines as "products which, in the present state of human knowledge, 
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary 
use." 63 The comment then appears to focus on "the field of drugs," 
where such products are "especially common,,. and presents three 
overlapping categories of unavoidably unsafe products: high-benefit, 
high-risk drugs, such as the vaccine used for the treatment of rabies; 
"many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which [because of 
high risks involved] cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or 
under the prescription of a physician;" and "many new or experimen-
tal drugs." 64 
The comment furnishes no criteria for determining how risky and 
how beneficial a drug must be in order to qualify under the first 
category as "unavoidably unsafe." In any event, such a determination 
would appear to be unnecessary for drugs. The second category may 
reasonably be read to include all prescription drugs, since federal law 
mandates that any medicine with toxic effects that render it unsafe as 
self-medication be sold under prescription65-and a high-risk, high-
benefit drug surely would be limited to sale by prescription. The 
sweeping requirement of prescription status also makes the third cate-
gory superfluous, a fortunate occurrence since the term "new or ex-
perimental drugs" is highly ambiguous. 66 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 98. 
"
3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965). For a detailed analysis of 
comment k, see Willig, The Comment k Character: A Conceptual Barrier to Strict Liability. 29 
Mercer L. Rev. 545 (1978). 
64 Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A comment k (1965). 
65 See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B) (1976) ("A drug intended for use by man which ... because 
of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral 
measures necessary to its use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner 
licensed by law to administer such drug ... shall be dispensed only [upon prescription] .... "). 
66 The adjective "experimental" seems to refer to the clinical-testing phase of the new-drug 
approval process. For descriptions of this phase of the process, see 1 J. O'Reilly, supra note 59, at 
13-39 to 13-46; Campbell, Civil Liability for Investigational Drugs: Part I, 42 Temple L.Q. 99, 
106-07 (1969). While the subsequent reference to the ''marketing" of such drugs suggests that 
they are generally available, the distribution of drugs used in clinical trials actually is highly 
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Thus, if its examples are taken seriously, comment k reasonably 
could be read as excluding from section 402A only unavoidably unsafe 
prescription drugs. The comment, however, fails to explain what 
might render an unavoidably unsafe product "defective" and thus 
subject to section 402A in the first instance. Instead, it states that if the 
known benefits of one of these products outweigh its known risks, it 
would not be considered "unreasonably dangerous, .. provided that it 
was prepared properly and bore adequate warnings and directions for 
use. 67 The negative implication of this statement radically expands the 
scope of the exemption. Since injury caused by any product whose 
risks outweigh its benefits presumably would be actionable under 
traditional negligence principles, 68 comment k may be read to remove 
from the reach of section 402A any product that is unavoidably unsafe 
as long as the manufacturer will not be subject to liability under a 
negligence rule for injury caused by the product. Such an exemption 
includes but is not limited to prescription drugs, an ironic turn in light 
of the ALI vote rejecting the proposed exemption for prescription 
drugs alone. 69 
To appreciate the effect of this interpretation of comment k, it is 
necessary to consider how sellers of unavoidably unsafe products 
might be held strictly liable in the absence of comment k. The con-
supervised. Coincidental with the evolution of § 402A and its comments was the passage of the 
Drug Amendments of 1962, which tightened up new drug clearance procedures. See Drug 
Industry Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 104, 76 Stat. 780, 784 (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 
348, 355 (1976)). 
Moreover, it is not at all clear what the drafters of§ 402A meant by a new but nonexperi-
mental drug. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines "new drug" as any drug "not generally 
recognized . . . as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the labeling thereof .... " 21 U.S.C. § 32l(p)(l) (1976). Dean Prosser's drug 
terminology, by drawing this distinction between new and experimental drugs, did not seem to 
conform to the statutory definition. 
''
1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965). 
"' See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 149 (4th ed. 1971) ("It is fundamental that the standard 
of conduct which is the basis of the law of negligence is determined by balancing the risk, in light 
of the social value of the interest threatened, and the probability and extent of the harm, against 
the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the course 
pursued."). 
Although courts might theoretically find the mere marketing of a dangerous product 
negligent because the risks outweighed the benefits, they have not yet done so. At least one recent 
case has asserted this claim against handgun manufacturers. See First Amended Complaint for 
Damages at 10-11, Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1982). See generally Note, 
Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common Law Approach, 51 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 771 (1983); Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Injuries from a Well-Made 
Handgun, 24 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 467 (1983). For the argument against using product liability 
as a means to achieve gun control, see D. Santarelli & N. Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: 
Aiming at Courts to Take Products Liability to the Limit (1982) (Washington Legal Foundation 
Monograph). 
'" See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. 
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sumer-contemplation test of comment F 0 seems to preclude liability in 
cases where the risks generally were known and therefore within the 
contemplation of the ordinary consumer. Under this test, if a patient 
suffers harm from a high-risk, high-benefit drug and the harm falls 
within the scope of the contemplated risk, the drug would not be 
unreasonably dangerous. Similarly, a warning about an adverse reac-
tion listed on the label of a prescription drug would be considered part 
of the contemplated risk, 71 as would be true of known risks posed by 
experimental drugs. Given the broad sweep of comment i, one can 
salvage independent meaning for comment k only by surmising that, 
without comment k, harm from unknown risks, or harm from known 
risks which turns out to be much graver than expected, generally 
would be actionable under theories of strict tort liability. With com-
ment k, therefore, one must surmise that a manufacturer of a product 
posing such risks would escape liability under section 402A if the 
product were "unavoidably unsafe." 
This analysis suggests that the function served by comment k is to 
exempt unknown risks created by unavoidably unsafe products, since 
comment i already excludes known risks. Yet this interpretation 
presents difficulties. The text of comment k is not at all specific on the 
point, and a matter as important as the treatment of unknown haz-
ards merits direct mention.72 Moreover, the comment focuses on 
known risks. Two of the three categories listed in the comment involve 
products unavoidably unsafe because of known risks, 73 such as a rabies 
70 See text accompanying note 45 supra. 
71 In the case of prescription drugs, the manufacturer discloses risks to the prescribing 
physician. The physician is then under a legal duty to inform patients of material risks associated 
with drug therapy. See Merrill, supra note 15, at 65-67. In rare instances, courts have imposed a 
duty upon the manufacturer to insure that the patient is aware of these risks. See, e.g., Reyes v. 
Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276-78 (5th Cir.) (polio vaccine), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 
(1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1968) (same). Thus, as a 
general proposition, contemplation of risk by the prescribing physician usually would satisfy the 
requirement of comment i. 
72 Shortly after § 402A was published in final form, Dean Prosser wrote a law review article 
in which he noted that "[t]he conclusion would be clearly indicated that, provided that the 
product, so far as is known at the time of the sale, is reasonably safe for its intended use, there is 
no liability for unavoidable dangers-if it were not for the state of confusion surrounding the 
question of lung cancer from smoking cigarettes." Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in 
California, 18 Hastings L.J. 9, 26 (1966). He apparently was convinced that strict liability 
should not extend to unknowable hazards. Why the comments to § 402A did not take a forthright 
position on the issue is puzzling. 
73 See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra. This emphasis is especially apparent in the case 
of a high-risk, high-benefit product, such as a cancer cure known to have fatal consequences for a 
small percentage of users. Dean Prosser mentioned such a hypothetical drug during the ALI floor 
debate on § 402A. See ALI Proceedings, supra note 39, at 54, 93. In referring to comment k, 
Dean Prosser stressed that it was designed to protect "the person who is selling a drug which is 
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vaccine. According to the comment, the manufacturers of these drugs 
should not be strictly liable for harm from the known risk, a proposi-
tion seemingly rendered superfluous by comment i. The third cate-
gory, "new or experimental drugs," however, does cover products that 
are unavoidably unsafe because of unknown risks. Indeed, one impor-
tant purpose of the clinical testing of experimental drugs is to learn 
more about adverse reactions they might cause. On the other hand, 
since a patient participating in clinical trials must give an informed 
consent, which includes an understanding that the harmful effects of 
the drug are not yet fully known, 74 any adverse reaction the patient 
suffers may be said to fall within the range of consumer contempla-
tion.75 
Comment j, unlike comment k, speaks specifically to product 
risks unknown at the time of marketing; but comment j raises more 
questions than it answers and sheds little light on the meaning of 
comment k. In discussing the duty to give warnings and directions for 
use, Dean Prosser indicated that the sellers of food need not provide 
warnings about common allergic reactions to their products, since 
they might reasonably assume that consumers who suffer from the 
allergy are aware of it. 76 This conclusion is consistent with the con-
sumer-contemplation of unreasonable danger test in comment i: to the 
ordinary consumer with a common allergy, an allergic reaction would 
be an expected hazard, and hence not unreasonable. The Reporter 
went on to state, however, that 
[ w ]here . . . the product contains an ingredient to which a substan-
tial number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one 
whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one which the 
consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the 
seller is required to give a warning against it, if he has knowledge, 
or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and 
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient 
and the danger. Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or those 
necessarily unsafe, although its utility outweighs the risk." American Law Institute, 41st Annual 
Meeting: Proceedings 360 (1965). Once again the implication is clear that the risk making the 
drug necessarily unsafe was known at the time the product was marketed. 
74 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(b)(l) (1983) (human subject of clinical trials must be told that "the 
particular treatment or procedure may involve risks to the subject ... which are currently 
unforeseeable"). 
1
' See Campbell, Civil Liability for Investigational Drugs: Part II, 42 Temple L.Q. 289, 335-
36 (1969). 
1
" "The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for example to 
eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn against them." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j (1965). 
870 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW {Vol. 58:85:3 
unduly dangerous for other reasons, warnings as to use may be 
required. 77 
This language is unclear on a number of points. \Vhy should the 
duty to warn unwary allergy victims be limited to cases in \Vhich a 
"substantial" segment of the populace is affected? Under ordinary 
negligence principles, one might find the risk of serious harm or death 
to a miniscule percentage of individuals, or even a single individual, 
to be sufficient justification for requiring a warning. 78 Also, if the risk 
is undiscoverable in the exercise of due care and hence need not be 
mentioned in the warnings or instructions for use, does it follow that 
the manufacturer will not be strictly liable for harm resulting from 
the risk? This seems to be a fair reading of the text. If so, strict liability 
will not attach even though the product was dangerous beyond the 
contemplation of the ordinary consumer. 
But what are the reasons for this departure from the comment i 
test? Does the last sentence of the paragraph indicate merely that 
drugs fall within the scope of the general duty to give warnings or 
directions in every case? Or does it mean that allergic reactions to 
drugs should be governed by the same principles applicable to reac-
tions to food, i.e., that users need not be warned about common risks 
that are known by both the manufacturer and the consumer? Should 
it be read even more expansively to preclude liability for harm from 
all unknowable adverse drug reactions, and, by extension, from all 
unknowable generic risks? If this gloss on the language of comment j is 
correct, comment k again would serve no purpose. 
Another noteworthy aspect of comment k is its suggestion that 
strict liability not be imposed on the manufacturers of "new or experi-
mental" drugs containing harmful or impure ingredients that could 
not be eliminated "because of lack of time and opportunity for suffi-
cient medical experience." 79 The scope of the "unavoidable product 
danger" exception would be eA.-tended beyond generic risks and would 
apply to garden variety defects, where something is actually "wrong" 
77 Id. 
7
" See Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1957) (allergic reaction to 
deodorant; duty to warn even though "only a miniscule percentage of potential customers could 
be endangered"); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758, 768 (~fo. 1958) (duty to discowr 
and warn of risks of serious allergic reaction; plaintiff was apparently first to suffer reaction from 
defendant's hair dye); see also Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the 
Requirement of a Defect, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 856, 866 (1963). But see Cudmore v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (adverse reaction to MER/29; 
manufacturer liable only if an .. appreciable number" of people e:-,;perience the ad\'erse reaction), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967). 
79 Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A comment k (1965). 
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with some units of the product. Such a view reads into comment k an 
"'impure ingredient" exception. 80 
If the risk of an impure or otherwise deleterious ingredient is 
known when a drug is marketed, but the manufacturer could not 
discover \Vhich doses contained the substance (as is the case of blood 
contaminated with serum hepatitis), an adequate warning on the 
label of the drug would place the defect within the scope of consumer 
e},:pectations. The product thus would not be unreasonably dangerous 
under the comment i test. 81 Impure ingredients whose presence is not 
known when the drug is sold (such as the offending agents in the polio 
vaccine case) pose a more difficult problem because of their similarity 
to impurities in food and manufacturing defects in mass-produced 
goods. The seller may be unaware of these defects and may be unable 
to discover them by economically feasible methods. But these in-
stances are plainly covered by the strict liability rule of section 402A. 82 
The comment k "impure ingredient" exemption should not apply 
to either of these cases. The exception should be narrowly limited to 
emergencies in which the usual precautions for assuring the purity of 
ingredients have not been taken, yet there is medical justification for 
using the drug. 83 The appropriate scope of the exception is thus so 
narrow that the exception would make more sense as an interpretation 
of the consumer contemplation test of comment i than as an exception 
to the strict liability rule of section 402A: in this particular context, 
assuming an adequate warning has been given, the risk of harmful 
ingredients is within the ambit of consumer contemplation. 
In conclusion, the Restatement's treatment of generic risks falls 
short on several counts. The requirement of a "defect" as a distinct 
element of strict liability was inserted to serve a function already 
''' A California decision might well have inspired this "impure-ingredient" exception. See 
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 607-08, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1960). In Gottsdanker, live polio virus constituted the "impure ingredient" in a polio 
vaccine. The court applied strict liability under a theory of implied warranty from the producer 
of the vaccine, since the specifications of the vaccine called for only inactive polio virus. 
hi In at least two blood-contamination cases, the labels on the products bore warnings, but 
the courts chose to ignore comment i, and instead used comment k as a basis for finding for the 
defendants. See Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331, 339-40, 317 A.2d 392, 397 (App. 
Div. 1974), affd per curiam, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 
N.r.t. 763, 764-65, 527 P.2d 1075, 1076-77 (Ct. App. 1974). 
h! The rule of strict liability applies even though "the seller has exercised all possible care in 
the preparation and sale of his product." Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A(2)(a) (1965}; see 
also Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965) ("If the article left 
the defendant's control in a dangerously unsafe condition ... the defendant is liable whether or 
not he was at fault in creating that condition or in failing to discover and eliminate it."). 
"
3 One hypothetical example would be the emergency production of a new vaccine to combat 
a serious and rapidly spreading epidemic. 
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adequately addressed by the "unreasonably dangerous" test. The Re-
statement fails to make a clear distinction between known and un-
known hazards, and never takes a forthright position on which of 
these two types of hazards strict liability should cover: either, neither, 
or both. This omission is surprising given the evident concern, re-
flected both in the ALI floor debates and the comments, over the 
effect of section 402A upon the manufacturers of drugs, vaccines, and 
cigarettes. Comment k also is vague in that it fails to make clear what 
kind of special rule it puts in place, what purposes it meets, and to 
what classes of products it applies. Finally, the ALI's position on 
generic product risks, uncertain though it may be, reflects policy 
judgments. While the ALI is a distinguished body, it is a private, 
nongovernmental entity.84 The courts have ultimate responsibility for 
translating policy into common-law rules, and the matter of liability 
for generic risks, and for toxic products in particular, requires more 
comprehensive scrutiny than has been afforded by the Restatement. 
III 
GENERIC PRODUCT RISKS RECONSIDERED 
When the Restatement's commentary on adverse reactions to 
drugs, food, and tobacco was drafted, the proposed rule of strict 
liability did not cover all products placed in the stream of com-
merce. 85 Thus, there was no need to consider how the full range of 
generic risks should be integrated into the framework of a strict liabil-
ity system. Even had the drafters reflected on this issue, their efforts 
may not have produced an internally consistent doctrine to cover 
harm from the ill effects of products for human consumption and 
intimate bodily use, and harm from the designed-in dangers of mass-
produced goods, for the problem is not an easy one. 
There are two basic approaches to the issue of liability for the 
deleterious effects of generic risks. One approach is to focus on strict 
liability as it has evolved in design-defect and warning cases, and to 
ask whether the manufacturer's duty to eliminate86 or warn of prod-
uct dangers extends to the particular generic hazard in question. The 
other approach is to ask whether the policy justifications for imposing 
84 For a description of the process by which the Restatements are drafted, see Goodrich. The 
Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 Wash. U.L.Q. 283, 287. 
85 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962); text accompanying 
notes 29-31 supra. Dean Prosser did not hide his belief, however, that the case law was moving in 
that direction. See ALI Proceedings, supra note 39, at 52-55. 
"
6 The manufacturer's duty might also extend to refraining from designing in product 
dangers. 
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strict tort liability in cases involving nongeneric risks, i.e., construc-
tion defects, where there is general agreement that it should be im-
posed, support the extension of strict liability to cases involving ge-
neric risks. Each of these approaches will be considered in the 
remainder of this section. 
A. Justifying Strict Liability for Generic Risks: Is the Duty in 
Design-Deject and Warning Cases Adequate? 
Under well settled principles of negligence law, a manufacturer 
has a duty to use reasonable care in the design of a product. 87 This 
obligation requires the manufacturer to use precautionary measures 
which are economically and technologically feasible, 88 and which will 
eliminate unreasonable risks of harm. The duty extends to risks of 
which the manufacturer is aware and, in the exercise of due care, 
should be aware. 89 If a hazard may be reduced by providing informa-
tion to the user of a product, the duty of reasonable care may be 
discharged by providing instructions and warnings. 90 
To have meaning in design cases, the concept of strict liability 
must make the manufacturer answerable for product-related harm for 
which negligence theories would provide no remedy. Strict liability 
potentially might extend to all generic risks, to risks that are designed 
into a product as well as to those naturally and unavoidably present. 91 
The failure to design out or to warn against these risks would render 
the manufacturer liable, even though the design change or warning 
might be economically or technologically infeasible, and even though 
the risk may have been unknown or unknowable at the time of 
production. 
'
7 See 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 7 (1982). 
" The duty of reasonable care has been interpreted, within an economically rational (i.e., 
profit maximizing) framework, as requiring an actor to expend on accident prevention an 
amount up to the projected cost of accidents that might occur in the absence of such an outlay. 
See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 32-33 (1972). The duty also obliges 
manufacturers to keep reasonably "abreast of techniques used by practical men in the industry." 
Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence As to Design, Instructions or \Varnings, 19 
Sw. L.J. 43, 51-52 (1965) (citing cases). 
,., For a discussion of the manufacturer's duty to test, see 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra 
note 87, ~ 6. 
•u See id. § 8. 
''
1 A rule of absolute liability would hold manufacturers responsible for all harm causally 
related to a product whether or not the product was defective. A rule of liability for harm from 
all generic risks associated with a product would be somewhat less than absolute, but nonetheless 
"ultra-strict." For a discussion of absolute liability in the products context, see Schwartz, 
Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 435, 441-48 (1979) (referred to as 
"genuine strict liability"). For use of the term" 'ultra-strict' liability," see Owen, Rethinking the 
Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 681, 714 (1980). 
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A theory of "ultra-strict" liability for harm from all generic 
hazards has found neither judicial nor scholarly acceptance. As Pro-
fessor Gary Schwartz has argued in a similar context, if loss spreading 
is our goal, we ought not to adopt a rule that discriminates against the 
victims of nonproduct-related accidents. 92 Courts adopting "ultra-
strict" product liability would find themselves on the fabled slippery 
slope and would be unable to offer any logical reason for not extend-
ing the doctrine to other contexts in which the public is routinely 
exposed to the risk of injury, such as the operation of premises held 
open for business or public purposes93 or leased to tenants. 94 Such 
radical changes in the common law surely and properly would en-
counter judicial hesitation, grounded upon the conviction that it 
would be more appropriate to leave the difficult policy judgments 
involved in adopting such an expansive rule to the legislature. 95 
The rejection of "ultra-strict" liability leaves open, however, the 
theoretical possibility of imposing strict liability for some harm caused 
by generic risks. For example, suppose an automobile manufacturer is 
deemed not liable for all harm to occupants who collide with the 
interior of a vehicle. Is there any way to assign responsibility for some 
but not all injuries attributable to the generic risks of the so-called 
"second collision" -to assign responsibility in fewer than all cases. as 
would be done under a rule of ultra-strict liability, yet in more cases 
than would be done under a rule of negligence? In other words, are 
there second collisions that the manufacturer could not have avoided 
by exercising reasonable care but for which the manufacturer should 
be held liable? This question has provoked considerable academic 
debate, much of it sharply critical of courts that have answered "yes" 
and imposed liability for injuries that were not reasonably avoidable 
92 Schwartz, supra note 91, at 445. Professor Schwartz also points out that the rule might not 
deter certain kinds of accidents, such as those caused by plaintiffs themselves or by other 
participants in the event, and that it might be difficult to determine which of several manufac-
turers whose products were involved in the accident ought to be held liable. Id. at 441-45. It is 
questionable whether his analysis, focusing on absolute liability, would apply equally in the 
context of "ultra-stricf' liability for harm from generic risks. 
93 See Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises: One Step Beyond Rowland and 
Greenman, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 820 (1975) (case for applying strict liability for harm from 
dangerously defective business premises). 
•• See Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict 
Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 19, 134-44 (case for applying strict liability for harm from 
defective leased premises). 
9s See Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 64:3, 
660-61 (1978) (legislatures are better suited than courts to consider and resolve issues raised by 
absolute or ultra-strict product liability); Owen, supra note 91, at 705-06 (legislature is more 
appropriate body to effectuate "distributive justice" via product liability rules). 
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without articulating a clear, workable standard for deciding when an 
alleged design flaw is defective or unreasonably dangerous. 96 The 
emerging consensus seems to be that design defects are best dealt with 
under a balancing test, 97 which is indistinguishable from the negli-
gence standard. Thus, the failure to develop judicially administrable 
criteria for strict liability has led to the conclusion that product manu-
facturers, absent negligence, should not be liable for failing to design 
out functional dangers. Commentators have concluded, in short, that 
there is no middle ground between negligence and "ultra-strict" liabil-
ity, at least in cases involving design defects. 
The one exception to this proposition, originally articulated by 
Deans Page Keeton 98 and John Wade, 99 and since adopted in several 
''" Design liability falling between the poles of ultra-strict liability and negligence may be 
imposed under the consumer-expectation test, which asks what type of design features guarding 
against the risk of injury an ordinary consumer would have e.'l:pected. Another compromise 
approach would use a fault-based standard which lessens the burdens traditionally assigned to 
plaintiffs in negligence cases. For a decision permitting both approaches, see Barker v. Lull 
Eng'g Co .. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978) 
(plaintiff may use either consumer-contemplation test or negligence-type balancing test, in 
which the burden is on defendant to establish that the design feature in question was not 
defective). 
For criticisms of Barker, see, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 13, at 602-18; Epstein, supra note 
95, at 650-54; Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: 
Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 773, 782-97 (1979). For 
an exhaustive and painstakingly fair-minded discussion of Barker, see Schwartz, supra note 91, 
at 464-82. 
"
7 For a classic balancing test, see Wade, supra note 31, at 837-38 (discussing factors used to 
weigh the risk of a product against its utility). Such an analysis has been adopted by several 
courts. See, e.g., Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1978); Bowman v. 
General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Other scholars have also urged 
the adoption of balancing tests. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 St. 
Mary's L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973). 
For the emerging consensus, see Birnbaum, supra note 13, at 649 (concluding that design 
defect cases should be decided under a negligence standard); Schwartz, The Uniform Product 
Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 579, 584-87 (1980) (discussing adoption of a 
negligence test for design and warning cases in the Uniform Product Liability Act). 
''' See Keeton, Products Liability-Adequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398, 407-08 
(1970) ("[T]he fact that the maker was e.'l:cusably unaware of the extent of the danger and had 
not committed any negligent act or omission that caused the danger would be entirely irrele-
vant."); Keeton, Some Observations About the Strict Liability of the Maker of Prescription 
Drugs: The Aftermath of MER/29, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 149, 158 (1968) ("A drug or any other 
product is unreasonably dangerous, I suggest, if, and only if, a reasonable man, with knowledge 
of the condition of the product and an appreciation of all the risks as found to exist at the time of 
the trial, would not now market the product at all or would do so pursuant to a different set of 
warnings and instructions as to use."). For the earliest mention of this exception, see Keeton, 
Products Liability-Current Development, 40 Te.'l:. L. Rev. 193, 210 (1961) (concluding that 
"excusable ignorance of a defect or the properties of a product is immaterial as regards warranty 
liability"). 
''' See 'Vade, supra note 31, at 834 ("assume that the defendant knew of the dangerous 
condition of the product and ask whether he was negligent in putting it on the market"); Wade, 
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jurisdictions, 100 is that knowledge of risks should be imputed to the 
manufacturer as of the time of production or sale. Thus, in determin-
ing whether to impose liability for failure to design out or warn of a 
danger, a jury might take into account hazards that were unknown, 
or even unknowable, to the manufacturer when the product was 
marketed. That the manufacturer could not have discovered these 
risks in the exercise of reasonable care would be irrelevant; if a hypo-
thetical reasonable manufacturer, aware of these risks, would not 
have marketed the product or would have warned of the dangers, an 
injured plaintiff may recover. 101 
This exception uses hindsight to achieve a genuine strict liability 
in certain cases of generic risks, such as adverse reactions to drugs, 
dusts, and chemicals. This hindsight approach, however, has not 
supra note 82, at 15 ("(A]ssuming that the defendant had knowledge of the condition of the 
product, would he then have been acting unreasonably in placing it upon the market?"). Dean 
Wade has recently stated that he never intended this broad language to apply to unknowable 
hazards, but only to manufacturing flaws in the condition of the product. See Wade, On the 
Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. Re\', 
734, 765 (1983). His position has heretofore widely been interpreted as being identical to that of 
Dean Keeton. See Birnbaum, supra note 13, at 619; Powers, supra note 13, at 791; Veltri, 
Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 Or. L. Rev. 293, 299 (1975). 
But see Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492 n.6, 52.'5 P.2d 1033, 1036 n.6 (1974) 
(en bane). 
100 See, e.g., Olsen v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d l16, l19 (5th Cir. 1968); Helene Curtis 
Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 91:3 (1968); 
Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd mem., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d 
Cir. 1973); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 200,447 A.2d 539,544 (1982); 
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (en bane). 
101 If knowledge or risk as of the time of marketing is to be imputed to the manufacturer, it 
would seem logical also to impute subsequently acquired knowledge of inefficacy. Hence, factors 
to be weighed in a strict liability action would include newly discovered information about risks 
and benefits. A New Jersey intermediate appellate court has refused to apply the hindsight 
approach to either risks or benefits in a DES decision. See Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. 
Super. 551, 576, 420 A.2d 1305, 1318 (Law Div. 1980). The court felt itself bound by comment k 
in product liability cases and interpreted the comment as mandating a foresight test. 
It would also seem logical that, if the product might reasonably have been marketed with 
knowledge of the risk and with adequate warnings, plaintiffs should have to establish that such 
warnings would have led them not to use the product. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 946-48. 
In most cases, however, this requirement would hinge resolution of the causation issue upon 
plaintiffs' credibility. Alternative approaches have been adopted. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs .. 498 
F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir.) (presumption, rebuttable by the manufacturer, that warning would 
have been heeded), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (causation to be determined by asking what a reasonable person in plaintiffs 
position would have decided if informed of all risks), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1974); ~lode! 
Uniform Product Liability Act § 104(C)(3) (Dep't of Commerce 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 
62,721 (1979) ("claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that if adequate 
warnings or instuctions had been provided, they would have been effective because a reasonably 
prudent product user would have either declined to use the product or would ha\'e used the 
product in a manner so as to have avoided the harm"). 
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received much policy-oriented justification either by courts or com-
mentators.102 The mere fact that it created a well-delineated area of 
strict liability in design and warning cases seemed to suffice. It was 
inevitable that a need for a firmer rationale would arise. 
The recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada 
v. ]ohm-Manville Products Corp. 103 attempted to provide such a ra-
tionale. The court held that asbestos manufacturers might be liable 
for lung diseases caused by exposure to asbestos dust at a time when 
the risks were unknown and undiscoverable, offering three reasons to 
support this extension of strict tort liability: the allocation of the costs 
of injuries to the parties best able to bear them; the reduction of risks 
by increasing incentives for safety research; and the elimination of the 
need for plaintiffs to prove scientific knowability, a factual determi-
nation that is too complex and speculative for jury resolution. 104 The 
potential problems with each of these reasons will be considered in 
turn. 
The first rationale offered, the notion that manufacturers of 
defective or unreasonably dangerous products are in a superior posi-
lvJ The applicability of the hindsight approach to drugs and cigarettes has been criticized. See, 
e.g., Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent in His 
Product, 32 Ins. Couns. J. 303, 306 (1965); Comment, supra note 58, at 530-35. For an effort to 
meet some of these criticisms, see James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some 
Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1550, 1555-58 (1966). 
lv3 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). 
1
"' See id. at 205-08, 447 A.2d at 547-48. The precise issue in Beshada was whether the trial 
judge erred in denying plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' assertion that the danger of 
which they failed to warn was undiscoverable when the products were marketed. The court 
referred to this assertion as a "state-of-the-art" defense. See id. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542. The term 
would seem to apply more properly and precisely to considerations of practical feasibility, 
relating to technology that might have been used to reduce a known risk. See \V. Keeton, D. 
Owen & J. Montgomery, Products Liability and Safety: Cases and Materials 465 (1980); Model 
Uniform Product Liability Act § 107(D) and commentary (Dep't of Commerce 1979), 44 Fed. 
Reg. 62,714, 62,728-30 (1979). The term, however, has also been used to encompass both 
technological feasibility and state of scientific knowledge. See Murray, The State of the Art 
Defense in Strict Products Liability, 57 Marq. L. Rev. 649, 651-52 (1974); Spradley, Defensive 
Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 343, 344-47 
(1982). 
Be.slwda is the first case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court has applied the hindsight 
approach to the unknowable adverse effects of a toxic product. Prior decisions had approved the 
test where plaintiffs sought recovery for harm from machinery which allegedly had been 
designed defectively or from a flammable liquid chemical. See Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, 
Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 239-41, 432 A.2d 925, 930-31 (1981) (flammable chemical); Suter v. San 
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 171-72, 406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (1979) (same); Cepeda 
v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163-75, 386 A.2d 816, 821-27 (1978) (defectively 
designed machine), overruled in part, 81 N.J. 150, 177,406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979). An intermedi-
ate appellate court in New Jersey has refused to apply the Beshada rule in a drug case. See 
Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 189 N.J. Super. 424, 432-33, 460 A.2d 203, 207-08 (App. Div. 1983). 
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tion to allocate the costs of product-related injuries, does not really 
help to answer the question of what makes a product defective or 
unreasonably dangerous. Nor does it answer the question of which 
costs should be shifted. 105 Compared with plaintiffs who are injured 
by products, manufacturers are almost always better able to bear risks 
by spreading losses through price adjustments and insurance. This 
rationale would therefore justify imposing liability for harm from 
risks known as well as unknown, reasonable as well as unreasonable, 
and ultimately would lead to "ultra-strict" liability. Because it proves 
too much, this rationale provides only weak justification for a nar-
rower rule of strict liability. 
Professor James Henderson has also criticized the risk-spreading 
rationale on the ground that a hindsight approach would misallocate 
the costs of liability from products creating risks that were unknown 
and unknowable at the time of sale. Manufacturers would add this 
cost to the prices of different, reasonably safe products or to the same 
products put to different, safe uses. Since the offending products 
would already have been priced and sold, their liability costs could 
not be assigned to them. Moreover, once manufacturers discover the 
danger, the product is removed from the market or redesigned, or 
appropriate warnings are given, and thus there is no longer any need 
to assign costs of liability. 106 
Such a result-product prices reflecting costs other than those 
caused by the product itself-would lead to market distortions and 
destroy the optimality properties that flow from cost-based pricing in 
a perfectly competitive market. 107 In a perfectly competitive market, 
cost minimization and profit maximization for a particular product, 
and not costs from earlier versions of a particular product, or different 
products altogether, will determine the price of the product. A manu-
facturer who tries to pass on these costs will be driven from the market 
by manufacturers who do not. Professor Henderson's argument thus 
squarely poses a paradox: the market distorting effects of misalloca-
tion can occur only in a noncompetitive market, where the effects of 
misallocation are ambiguous. 108 Because of competitive market pres-
105 See Owen, supra note 91, at 703-07. 
106 See Henderson, supra note 11, at 942-44. 
107 A perfectly competitive economy is "efficient'" (i.e., scarce resources are allocated opti-
mally) and "Pareto optimal" (i.e., no one can be made "better off' without making someone 
"worse off'). For a serious yet nonmathematical discussion of these concepts, see J. Quirk, 
Intermediate Microeconomics 229-45 (1976). 
108 The distortions that make a market noncompetitive also destroy the optimality properties 
of perfectly competitive equilibrium. Adding additional distortions to the market may improve 
the situation, or it may make the situation worse. Economists have labelled this ambiguity the 
theory of the "second best." For a general discussion of this theory, see id. at 24:3-44. 
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sures, 109 unanticipated liability costs are more likely to be paid out of 
profits, loans, or sources other than price increases.U0 
It is important to distinguish between the allocation that would 
result from the retroactive application of a hindsight rule and that 
from the prospective application.lll The court in Beshada pointed out 
that application of the rule of strict liability for unknowable risks "will 
force the price of any particular product to reflect the cost of insuring 
against the possibility that the product will turn out to be defec-
tive." 112 Thus, the threat of prospective liability would force a proper 
allocation of product prices. 113 When a court initially adopts a hind-
sight rule and imposes it retroactively, however, the prices of products 
marketed years, or, in the case of asbestos, decades, earlier will not 
bear their own liability costs. 114 In the case of asbestos, this "first shot'' 
problem is enormous. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not ask 
whether considerations of fairness deriving from justifiable reliance by 
asbestos manufacturers, 115 or the enormous potential liability to which 
the industry might be e:...:posed, supported the recognition of a hind-
sight rule that would operate prospectively only.U6 
For all of these reasons-because it proves too much, because it 
may or may not apply depending on market conditions, and because 
its effectiveness depends on whether the application is prospective or 
retroactive-the risk-spreading rationale raises more questions than it 
answers and provides only weak support for a rule of strict liability. 
1
"'' \Vhether a particular market is competitive, of course, is an empirical question, and the 
aw;wer can vary from market to market. 
n" If the market is competitive, manufacturers are earning what economists call "normal 
profits," the profits necessary to continue functioning as an ongoing business. If profits drop, the 
manufacturer will encounter problems raising new capital (a result of insufficient returns on the 
capital already invested in the firm) and may have to withdraw from the market. Recovering 
liability costs from profits, therefore, may drive firms from the market. In noncompetitive 
markets, however, where firms earn "super profits," the result may be entirely different. 
HI The problem is discussed in Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, 
Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 796, 825 (1983). 
ll2 90 N.J. at 206, 447 A.2d at 547. 
113 This conclusion assumes that a manufacturer will be able to obtain adequate protection 
against the unknown and the unknowable, risks that would have to be translated somehow into 
monetary terms and factored into the cost of liability insurance premiums, which product prices 
would then reflect. 
ll< Of course, the same is true whenever liability is e.-..:panded at common law-parties who 
have already avoided liability in the past continue to do so under the new rule as well. See R. 
Keeton, Venturing to Do Justice: Reforming Private Law 25-26 (1969). 
115 Since the hindsight approach was first suggested in 1961, see note 98 supra, manufacturers 
were arguably on notice that liability for harm from unknowable risks might one day be imposed 
upon them. In Be.shada. however, the exposures to asbestos dust dated back to the 1930's. 
nu It would be difficult to apply the hindsight rule prospectively only. If it were limited to 
injury sustained in the future, or after 1961, problems of proof would greatly complicate cases 
involving prolonged harmful e.-..:posures. 
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The second policy justification offered in Beshada was that a rule 
of strict liability would spur safety research that might reveal hidden 
dangers. 117 Put another way, a contrary rule would benefit producers 
who were unaware of risks and thus would tend to perpetuate igno-
rance, especially if plaintiffs could not easily establish that a hazard 
might have been detected in the exercise of due care. Admittedly, if 
the existence of a hazard were completely unknown at the time of 
marketing, a manufacturer would be unable to determine how much 
to spend in order to make the discovery, and there may be no increase 
in safety research. 118 On the other hand, if a hazard were suspected or 
were known to exist but its full extent were not known, the incentive 
for additional investigation could produce some incremental level of 
safety. In either instance, though, this incentive for safety research 
would justify a rule of strict liability because the manufacturer can 
always uncover the known risks better and more cheaply than the 
potential victim. 119 
It is worth noting that Beshada involved asbestos rather than a 
drug. Federal regulation prescribes the nature and amount of safety 
testing that must be done before the marketing of a new medica-
tion.120 In using stimulation of safety research as a rationale for a rule 
of strict liability for unknown risks, a court would be explicitly or 
implicitly recognizing a general need for more extensive premarket 
investigation than presently required by the FDA. This recognition, 
however, goes far beyond judicial determinations in individual cases 
that FDA approval of a particular new drug does not preclude a 
finding of negligence or strict liability. 121 While the safety-incentive 
117 "The 'state-of-the-art' at a given time is partly determined by how much industry im ests in 
safety research. By imposing on manufacturers the costs of failure to discover hazards, we create 
an incentive for them to invest more actively in safety research.'' 90 N.J. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548. 
118 It has been argued that the hindsight approach will deter manufacturers from testing to 
discover whether products already on the market are causing harm. See Henderson, supra note 
11, at 940-41. This course of action will be effective only if the harm or its connection with the 
manufacturer's product remains undetected indefinitely. There are, however, many other ways 
in which such information may come to light. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1976) (manufac-
turers of consumer products required to notify Consumer Product Safety Commission of substan-
tial product hazards); 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976) (notification requirement for defective automo-
biles). Manufacturers would therefore benefit from rapid discovery of harm caused by their 
products: they can undertake a recall or reduce the risks to reasonable proportions by issuing 
appropriate warnings. 
119 See notes 132-33 infra. 
120 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 310, 312, 314 (1983) (FDA regulations governing the approval process for 
new drugs). 
121 For cases finding that FDA approval of a warning is not conclusive on the issue of the 
adequacy of the warning, see, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 
(1st Cir. 1981); Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65-66, 507 P.2d 653, 661-62, 107 
Cal. Rptr. 45,53-54 (1973); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375,396-400,528 
P.2d 522, 533-35 (1974). 
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rationale is not indefensible, 122 some courts might give it less weight 
than they would otherwise because of its far-reaching implications. 
Another problem with the accident-avoidance rationale is that it 
leaves open the following question: why should courts impose strict 
liability upon manufacturers for harm from hazards of unknown 
scope as an incentive to discover the true scope of the risks, but not 
apply strict liability as a spur to technological development where at 
the time of production it was technologically infeasible to eliminate or 
to reduce risks? There is widespread agreement that in the latter cases, 
involving the so-called "state of the art" issue, 123 manufacturers will 
not be liable, absent negligence, for having failed to use today's safety 
technology yesterday .124 It is difficult to distinguish between technol-
ogy that can detect the gravity of risk and technology that can elimi-
nate or reduce risk, or to conclude that strict liability would act as a 
spur to tlie advancement of the former but not of the latter. 125 
The third justification for strict liability offered by the Beshada 
court is that the litigation process cannot adequately determine scien-
tific knowability. 126 But although the same might be said of the need 
to decide whether a manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care in 
designing a product, 127 courts have not stopped resolving these is-
m Proposed FDA regulations would streamline the drug-approval process and hence reduce 
the time required to bring new medications into unrestricted commercial use. See New Drug and 
Antibiotic Regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,622 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 310, 312, 314, 430, 
431, 433) (proposed June 23, 1982). The recent removal of the antiarthritic drug Oraflex from 
the market because of its association with the deaths of a number of users, see Newsweek, Aug. 
16, 1982, at 59, col. 1, however, has provoked criticism about the adverse implications for safety 
of drug deregulation. SeeN. Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1982, at 7F, col. 2. That the new proposal would 
permit the FDA to rely more heavily upon foreign clinical studies also has been seriously 
questioned. See The New Drug Review Process: Hearings on the Regulation of New Drugs by the 
Food and Drug Administration Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and 
Human Resources of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 312-52 
(1982). 
123 The term is used here to mean technological feasibility. See note 104 supra. 
12
' See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 67-69, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326-27 
(1978); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746, 748 (Tex. 1980). 
125 Professor Henderson, who disapproves of the hindsight rule, argues that strict liability 
would not provide increased incentives for manufacturers to develop technology that eliminates 
or lessens risks; the incentive already exists in the market. Even Henderson recognizes, however, 
that although information about product risks does not generate profits, the subsequently 
developed risk-reduction technology might well provide competitive advantages to its creator, 
and a strict liability rule might well stimulate this type of technology. See Henderson, supra note 
11, at 952-53. Moreover, risk information may have considerable value in discrediting a competi-
tor's product. See Page, Not So Sure: The Underarm Menace, The New Republic, Apr. 12, 1975, 
at 8 (competitor discovered hazards associated with a rival's antiperspirant and submitted the 
data to the FDA). 
1z" 90 N.J. at 206-07, 447 A.2d at 548-49. 
m See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits 
of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531 (1973) (developing the idea of "'polycentricity"-that 
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sues. 128 The scientific speculation inherent in deciding whether a par-
ticular hazard was knowable may produce more uncertainty than a 
dispute about whether designing out a known danger was feasible; 
this greater degree of uncertainty might tip the balance in favor of 
giving at least some weight to this particular rationale for strict liabil-
ity. The elimination of the need to establish knowability would cer-
tainly reduce trial costs, but so would dispensing with the burden of 
proving lack of due care in design cases. 
Since design and warning cases generally are decided by balanc-
ing factors that are virtually identical to those used to determine 
negligence, it is difficult to justify treating unknown or unknowable 
generic risks as falling within the duty to design or warn but outside 
the balancing approach. Ultimately, however, a de facto negligence 
test for all generic risks is unsatisfactory because this standard does not 
take into account the compelling policy reasons for adopting a strict 
liability theory. I now turn to those policy reasons, which have been 
recognized in the context of nongeneric risks. 129 
B. Justifying Strict Liability for Generic Risks: Are the Policies 
Underlying Strict Liability in Construction Deject Cases Adequate? 
The conceptual treatment of liability for harm from unknowable 
generic risks as deriving from the manufacturer's duty to design or to 
warn creates a discomforting impression: that liability is being im-
posed for a failure to do the impossible. An alternative approach is to 
view generic risk through the same lens that, when focused upon the 
risk of harm from construction defects, has produced a rule of strict 
liability even when it might have been economically infeasible or 
technologically impossible to eliminate the hazard. Here the theory 
design decisions are multifaceted and altering one aspect of a design might cause a "defect" in 
another part of the design); R. Epstein, Modern Product Liability Law 84-90 (1980) (agreeing 
with Professor Henderson). For judicial concurrence with this view, see Dawson v. Chrysler 
Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing in dictum that design decisions are 
polycentric), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). 
128 For explicit rejections of this criticism in the product-design context, see Bowman v. 
General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242, 245-46 (E.D. Pa. 1977): Owens v. Allis-Chalmers 
Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372,377-78 (Mich. 1982); McMullen v. Volkswagen of Am., 274 Or. 83,86-
90, 545 P.2d 117, 119-21 (1976); Schwartz, supra note 91, at 449-51. 
129 The criticism that these same policy reasons might support extensions of the strict liability 
doctrine beyond product liability does not necessarily preclude modest steps in that direction. 
Courts traditionally have permitted the common law to develop gradually and incrementally: 
indeed, case-by-case lawmaking permits no other method. The central role of consumerism in 
contemporary Vvestern society makes especially appropriate the use of product liability as a 
testing ground for deviations from traditional fault principles and toward risk spreading. 
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does not rest so much on any real or presumed inadequacy in the 
manufacturing process as on a policy decision to impose liability 
without fault. Thus, it may be appropriate to inquire whether the 
bases of strict liability for construction defects support a similar rule 
for generic risks. 
Manufacturers are strictly liable for harm from construction de-
fects even if they could not have eliminated, or discovered, such 
defects by exercising reasonable care. 130 Held to the standard of their 
own plans and specifications, manufacturers must answer for imper-
fections that arise from their production processes. 131 Of the various 
reasons that have been advanced to justify this rule of strict liability in 
construction defect cases, 132 three seem worthy of discussion in the 
context of generic risks: accident avoidance, loss spreading, and the 
satisfaction of justifiable consumer expectations. 133 
13
" See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1965). 
131 SeeR. Epstein, supra note 127, at 68. As Epstein notes, this obligation is well settled. 
132 Professors John E. Montgomery and David G. Owen have identified seven policy justifica-
tions for imposing strict tort liability on manufacturers of defective products: 
(1) Manufacturers convey to the public a general sense of product quality through the use 
of mass advertising and merchandising practices, causing consumers to rely for their 
protection upon the skill and expertise of the manufacturing community. 
(2) Consumers no longer have the ability to protect themselves adequately from defective 
products due to the vast number and comple.xity of products which must be "consumed" in 
order to function in modern society. 
(3) Sellers are often in a better position than consumers to identify the potential product 
risks, to determine the acceptable levels of such risks, and to confine the risks within those 
levels. 
(4) A majority of product accidents not caused by product abuse are probably attributable 
to the negligent acts or omissions of manufacturers at some stage of the manufacturing or 
marketing process, yet the difficulties of discovering and proving this negligence are often 
practicably insurmountable. 
(5) Negligence liability is generally insufficient to induce manufacturers to market ade-
quately safe products. 
(6) Sellers almost invariably are in a better position than consumers to absorb or spread 
the costs of product accidents. 
(7) The costs of injuries flowing from typical risks inherent in products can fairly be put 
upon the enterprises marketing the products as a cost of their doing business, thus assuring 
that these enterprises will fully "pay their way" in the society from which they derive their 
profits. 
!lfontgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for 
Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. Rev. 803, 809-10 (1976). Although these policy justifications apply 
generally to product liability law, they are particularly relevant to construction-defect cases, 
where there is general agreement that strict liability should apply. 
133 Judge Traynor advanced these arguments in his seminal concurring opinion in Escola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-63, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944), to support a rule of 
"absolute liability" for product defects. 
The need to protect consumers from the complexities of modern product technology, the 
manufacturer's superior capacity to control risks, and the desirability of forcing manufacturers to 
internalize costs associated with product risks all justify the public policy objective of accident 
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Whether strict liability will actually foster accident avoidance 
has been seriously questioned. It has been argued that producers will 
avoid only those accidents worth avoiding-if it is cheaper to let an 
accident happen and to pay the resulting liability costs, the profit-
maximizing manufacturer will follow that course. Thus, if testing and 
quality-control procedures would cost more than projected liability 
costs, a rule of strict liability would not encourage manufacturers to 
adopt procedures to prevent accidents. 134 
This argument, however, is not entirely persuasive. A manufac-
turer bound by negligence principles might foresee escaping some 
liability costs that should attach when it does not exercise due care. 
The difficulties of proving fault might be too great for injured plain-
tiffs in certain kinds of cases, 135 or economic constraints might force 
plaintiffs to accept unfavorable settlements. 136 Anticipating these 
lower liability costs, manufacturers might spend less on accident pre-
vention. By reducing plaintiffs' burdens, a strict liability rule might 
well encourage manufacturers to increase safety expenditures to the 
level they might reach under a negligence system that functioned 
optimally. 137 
The adoption of a rule of strict liability in cases where a manu-
facturer knew a risk existed but did not know its full extent also might 
increase safety by providing an incentive to perform additional inves-
tigations.138 Indeed, assuming that manufacturers foresee that, under 
negligence principles, not every injured plaintiff will recover full 
damages for harm from a particular design feature or warning, the 
application of strict liability to all generic hazards, known and un-
known, will increase the prospect of full recovery, encouraging safety 
avoidance. Liberalized discovery procedures and doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur appt'ar 
sufficient to overcome barriers that might once have been insurmountable to many plaintiffs 
suffering product-related harm. 
134 See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. Legal Stud. 205, 209 (1973): Sachs, Negli-
gence or Strict Product Liability: Is There Really a Difference in Law or Economics?. 8 Ga. J. 
Int'l & Comp. L. 259, 274-76 (1978). 
135 Indeed, Judge Traynor relied in part on this rationale in his concurrence in Escola. See 24 
Cal. 2d at 463, 150 P.2d at 441. 
136 Product liability suits usually are financed through contingent fees. To the extent attorneys 
perceive "tougher odds" under a negligence regime, they will be less willing to take on cases than 
they would be under a rule of strict liability. Plaintiffs will thus be unable to "finance" their 
litigation. Moreover, some plaintiffs may need the money now~ even if it is less than they might 
receive later. 
137 This criticism uses economic theory to respond to an economic argument. In the prt'Sence 
of market imperfections like problems of proof (imperfect information) and costs of litigation 
(capital market imperfections), there may well be a role for intervention (a rule of strict liability) 
in the market. 
138 See text accompanying note 118 supra. 
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e:,<,:penditures and accident avoidance. This increase in safety enhance-
ment standing alone, however, is probably insufficient to justify lia-
bility without fault in these cases. 
The "loss-spreading" rationale rests on the manufacturers' ability 
to use insurance to spread the costs 139 of harm caused by construction 
defects more efficiently and more easily than product victims can. 140 
Construction defects are easily insurable for two reasons: the number 
of claims likely to arise from such defects is fairly predictable, and this 
number is likely to be relatively small in comparison with the total 
number of products placed into the market. 141 Insurance against these 
risks, therefore, is readily available because the costs are predictable 
and the harm to be insured against normally will remain within 
modest bounds. 142 The number of known generic risks likely to oc-
cur-ranging from adverse drug reactions for which warnings have 
been given 143 to automobile accidents 144-can also be predicted with 
some certainty. Rough estimates can even be made about risks whose 
presence is known but whose extent cannot be calculated. The only 
type of hazard that would not permit even a guess would be the 
unknown and undiscoverable danger. 
In the case of generic risks, however, the other aspect of insur-
ability-a comparatively small number of risks-is absent. Unlike 
construction defects that affect only a small percentage of users, every 
generic risk will endanger every user of the product. Thus, the 
amount of damage attributable to generic product risks could be 
enormous, even if recoveries are reduced to take into account the 
131 A5 noted earlier, this rationale leaves open the question of which costs ought to be shifted. 
See text accompanying note 105 supra. 
uo When dealing with both the manufacturers' and consumers' abilities to insure, I assume 
the existence of well-functioning insurance markets to which the respective parties have access. 
Depending on the type of loss one seeks insurance against, this may or may not be an empirically 
justifiable assumption. 
141 See Owen, supra note 91, at 691-92; Schwartz, supra note 97, at 585. Professor Owen, 
while acknowledging the predictability of construction defects ("product flaws"), does not view 
this predictability as a valid basis for distinguishing construction defects from design defects. 
142 Some construction defects, however, have significant costs. For example, construction 
defects in automobiles may affect large numbers of vehicles. See, e.g., Brown, Rear-\Vheel Loss 
Feared in Millions of GM's Sedans, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1983, at C7, col. 5 (improperly 
manufactured component associated with partial or total separation of rear axle shaft and wheel 
assembly). A defect affecting every automobile could have even more disastrous consequences. 
See Werber, Automobile Recall Campaigns: Proposals for Legislative and Judicial Responses, 56 
U. Det. J. Urb. L. 1083, 1085 (1979). 
143 The FDA approves new drugs on the basis of cost-benefit judgments that take into account 
the risks of adverse reactions. See 1 J. O'Reilly, supra note 59,§ 14.05. 
144 See Owen, supra note 91, at 692 (discussing cost-benefit assessments of fuel tanks in the 
rear of Pintos). 
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comparative responsibilities of plaintiffs, third persons, and other 
enterprises that might appropriately share the losses. One might ar-
gue, then, that loss spreading makes sense only in the context of 
construction defects, where the relatively modest costs can be more 
easily absorbed by the manufacturer. 
An intermediate position might hold manufacturers strictly liable 
for unavoidable hazards, such as adverse reactions to toxic products. 
but not for designed-in, functional dangers, such as the speed of an 
automobile. This compromise position, however, has several prob-
lems. As a practical matter, it is difficult to base a rule of strict 
liability on degrees of potential damage: the notion that the more 
harm a defendant may cause the less likely it is that liability will 
attach strikes a somewhat perverse chord. Moreover, the focus on the 
quantity of loss may well be misguided. If the purpose of loss spread-
ing is to deflect the economic impact of product-related harm away 
from those who may not be able to absorb it, perhaps the focus should 
be on the victims' capacity to pay for their own injuries, and not on 
the aggregate cost of all such injuries. 
Consumers' ability to foresee product risks is relevant to a deter-
mination of their ability to insure themselves against those risks, and 
thus to a determination of their capacity to absorb the cost of their 
own injuries. The policy of satisfying justifiable consumer expecta-
tions 145 may shed light on this issue of cost absorption in particular 
and on the appropriateness of strict liability for generic product risks 
in general. 
The notion that manufacturers should be strictly liable for harm 
from product frustration is rooted in the doctrine of implied warranty 
of merchantability, which holds goods to the standard of reasonable 
fitness for their intended use. 146 Products placed into the stream of 
commerce carry with them a representation of safety, the scope of 
which is determined by what the ordinary consumer would expect of 
those products. 147 This representation of safety underlies the consumer 
contemplation test set out in comment i of the Restatement. 
145 For articulations of the consumer-contemplation approach to strict product liability, set' 
generally Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict 
Liability for Defective Products, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 465 (1978); Shapo, A Representational 
Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappoint-
ment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1974). 
146 u.c.c. § 2-314 (1978). 
147 See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. Re\'. 339, 348-52 
(1974). 
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It is important to distinguish between two uses of consumer 
expectations: the goal of meeting justifiable consumer expectations as 
a policy behind strict tort liability, and the use of consumer expecta-
tions as a criterion for deciding whether strict liability should apply in 
a particular instance. The former derives from the conviction that, as 
a matter of fairness, consumers should be entitled to rely on the 
representation of safety made by the seller of a product and by any 
information accompanying the product. Consumers depend on the 
manufacturer to provide goods that will meet these implied represen-
tations so that they can make rational judgments affecting their own 
well-being. The imposition of strict liability will encourage producers 
to satisfy these consumer e},:pectations, will permit consumers to act on 
the assumption that expectations will be met, and will enable con-
sumers to survive the economic hardship of unexpected losses. 148 
When using consumer expectations as a criterion for applying 
strict liability, the critical task is to determine which consumer expec-
tations are justifiable. The rule in construction defect cases suggests 
that courts have found such defects to lie outside the ambit of con-
sumer contemplation; consumers, therefore, may justifiably expect 
products to be free of construction flaws, and manufacturers will be 
held strictly liable for all such flaws: known, unknown, and unknow-
able.149 In design defect cases, however, courts apply what amounts to 
a negligence test 150 and say in effect that consumers justifiably may 
expect only that due care, measured as of the time of manufacture, 
will be exercised with regard to design and warning decisions. 
Is this distinction tenable? Given what the average person un-
doubtedly knows about product quality (especially in light of the 
publicity given to recalls of automobiles and other household pro-
ducts), all types of risk-creating flaws, both in construction and de-
sign, are arguably within the contemplation of ordinary consumers. 151 
In some cases, awareness of a vague possibility that some defect might 
1
" See Shapo, supra note 145, at 1124-31. \Vhen consumers expect a loss, they can insure 
against the loss themselves. It is only when the loss is unexpected that compensation, under a rule 
of strict liability, is needed . 
... , See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra. 
WJ See note 97 and accompanying text supra. 
1
" As Professor Owen has argued, 
[F]rom a more abstract perspective of social psychology, it may well be that the typical 
consumer knows full well that of the thousands of cars spewed out by Detroit on a daily 
basis many hundred at least will house production errors of various types and levels of 
danger . . . . It thus may be that consumer expectations are no more violated in cases of 
production flaws than in those involving design adequacies. 
Owen, supra note 91, at 693. 
888 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:85:3 
lurk somewhere within a product ought not to establish the risk as 
within the consumers' contemplation. The wide range of potential 
flaws, especially in complex items such as automobiles and workplace 
machinery, and the varying degrees of potential risk associated with 
such flaws, renders a general awareness practically useless to the 
consumer. 152 Moreover, the marketing image of a product may dim an 
already faint awareness of the risk. A rule of strict liability for con-
struction defects, then, reflects a justifiable judicial determination 
that consumers merit protection under a standard requiring goods to 
be completely free of such defects. 
A practical reason for limiting justifiable consumer expectations 
to the exercise of reasonable care in the design of products is that there 
is no other workable standard by which courts may determine 
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. Consumers usually are 
unable to form an e}.-pectation about the extent to which design defects 
will be eliminated: it is not a matter of expecting one unit of a 
particular product to be as good as the next. 153 Therefore, the best that 
consumers can justifiably e}.-pect in the design defect context is that 
manufacturers will use technologically and economically feasible 
methods to reduce or eliminate foreseeable risks. 
The policy of satisfying justifiable consumer expectations also 
dictates the refusal to impose strict liability for harm from known 
generic risks. The ordinary consumer appreciates the dangers posed by 
a speeding automobile or a sharp knife, and would therefore have no 
cause to believe that a manufacturer would do more than use due care 
to reduce these hazards. Contemporary smokers know of the risk of 
cancer from cigarettes. The presence of warnings on the label of 
prescription drugs makes physicians, acting on their patients' be-
halves, aware of the relevant risks. In each of these cases, consumers 
can make a rational judgment about the scope of the hazard and act 
accordingly. 154 
m See Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?. 42 Ind. L.J. 
301, 315-16 (1967). 
153 For criticisms of the consumer-contemplation test in the design defect context. see Keeton. 
Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Cum. L. Rev. 29:3. :300-05 
(1979); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 132, at 823; Schwartz, supra note 91, at 471-81. 
154 Dean Keeton has argued that the consumer-contemplation approach to strict liability 
would deny recovery to plaintiffs injured by an open and obvious design defect. See Keeton. 
supra note 153, at 302. The so-called "patent danger" rule, developed under negligence law. has 
been severely criticized. See generally Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: 
Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065 (1973). The 
recent trend has been to reject the rule and to permit obviousness of risk to be weighed as merely 
one factor in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. See Pike v. Frank G. 
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But if the danger or its full dimensions do not become evident 
until after the plaintiff has been exposed to the product, the con-
sumer-contemplation policy supports the imposition of strict liability. 
The product has inflicted an unpleasant surprise. Although the manu-
facturer could not have discovered the danger or its extent, the mar-
keting of the product misled the consumer with an implied representa-
tion of safety that was not met and thus deprived the consumer of the 
opportunity to evaluate the risk and to decide whether to accept it. 155 
Under this new view of consumer e1:pectations, a product posing an 
unknown or unknowable generic hazard would stand on the same 
footing as a product with a construction flaw: each product would be 
considered unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict liability be-
cause it frustrated justifiable consumer e1:pectations recognized by the 
law. 
The need to integrate liability for product-related harm to non-
consumers into a scheme structured around consumer expectations 
raises a conceptual problem. Professor Gary Schwartz has noted that a 
third-party beneficiary theory can preserve the viability of the con-
sumer-expectations test in instances where the consumer could reason-
ably be deemed to have contemplated the conferral of accident-avoid-
ance benefits upon others. 156 The extension of the implied warranty of 
merchantability, which under the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
tects anyone "who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be 
affected by the goods," 157 lends support to this argument by analogy. 
But it would be stretching things beyond the breaking point to assume 
that a consumer intends to protect bystanders, especially those who 
are total strangers. As a practical matter, this problem will be limited 
to construction defect cases: the de facto negligence test used to deter-
mine liability in design defect cases applies equally well to consumers 
and bystanders; 158 and unknown generic risks will rarely endanger 
Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 473-74, 467 P.2d 229, 234-35, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 634-35 (1970); 
Micallefv. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376,384-85,348 N.E.2d 571, 576-77,384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 120-
21 (1976). See generally Phillips, Products Liability: Obviousness of Danger Revisited, 15 Ind. L. 
Rev. 797 (1982). Hence, where product risks are open and obvious, plaintiffs may still be able to 
establish negligent design. 
105 Note that this consumer-expectations rationale, unlike the safety enhancement and loss-
spreading rationales discussed above, applies to risks unknown or even unknowable; the focus is 
on the consumer's state of knowledge, and not on the manufacturer's state of technology. 
'"" See Schwartz, supra note 91, at 474-75. 
IS7 U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978) (alternatives B and C). 
~'·' Under a negligence test, the manufacturer's duty would be to avoid creating unreasonable 
risks of harm to foreseeable victims, a class that would include bystanders as well as users. See 1 
L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 87, § 5.03(1)(c). 
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anyone other than a product user. 159 These limitations, however, do 
not eliminate the theoretical hurdle. 
One answer is simply to recognize that the policy of satisfying 
justifiable expectations supports the imposition of strict liability only 
on behalf of consumers and their intended beneficiaries. To hold 
manufacturers liable without fault for harm to bystanders would then 
require a separate, independent rationale. A second, and perhaps 
preferable, solution lies in a reassessment of the consumer-contempla-
tion policy. Its roots, as has been noted,I60 go back to the doctrine of 
implied warranty of merchantability, the primary concern of which 
was the adjustment of the rights of parties to commercial transactions. 
Although courts fashioning tort doctrine may legitimately borrow 
from sales law, they need not feel fettered by sales law constraints. 
Where the same policy goals would be applicable to nonconsumers, it 
might be logical to extend strict liability protection beyond the pur-
chaser. Thus, the user of a product personally relies upon the implied 
representations of safety inherent in the product. Certain bystanders 
may also entertain similar expectations that a product will not injure 
them. This approach would require courts to differentiate between 
two classes of bystanders: the first is exemplified by a pedestrian 
injured when an automobile goes out of control because of a construc-
tion defect; the second by the person harmed while asleep at home by 
an airplane that crashed because of a flaw in its assembly. In the latter 
case, the victim had no expectation generated or frustrated by the 
product. 161 The falling airplane was like a falling meteorite-com-
pletely une:\'})ected-an event for which there is no tort remedy. 
Hence the consumer-contemplation rationale, expanded to take into 
account the actual expectations of users and bystanders, would not 
support recovery by such victims under strict liability. 
CoNCLUSION 
This Article has proposed a conceptual framework for determin-
ing when to apply strict liability to generic product risks. On the 
twentieth anniversary of the first decision to hold product manufac-
turers strictly liable in tort, 162 the parameters of the doctrine remain in 
159 For one example of how generic risks may endanger bystanders, seeP. Brodeur, Asbestos 
and Enzymes 25 (1972) (report that wives of seven asbestos workers who had regularly brushed 
their husbands' work clothes died from mesothelioma, a cancer associated with e:-posure to 
asbestos dust). 
160 See text accompanying note 146 supra. 
161 This conclusion is based on the assumption that airplanes do not regularly fly O\'er the 
house. 
162 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 
(1962). 
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flmi:. Federal legislation threatens to restrict the doctrine to harm from 
nongeneric risks. 163 Conflicts and uncertainties in the common law of 
product liability as it has evolved in the states have been cited as a 
major justification for federal action. 164 
The case for salvaging some remnant of strict liability within the 
area of generic product risks is not an easy one. The use of a policy-
based analysis, however, makes it possible to link the accepted view 
that the rule should apply to construction defects to the admittedly 
controversial proposition that harm from unknown or unknowable 
generic risks should be compensated in the same fashion. The advan-
tage of this approach is that it provides a coherent, principled basis for 
excluding other kinds of generic product risks from a rule of strict tort 
liability. Both the satisfaction of justifiable expectations on the part of 
product victims and the achievement of modest advances in safety 
justify the application of strict liability to harm from unknowable 
generic hazards. 
Neither section 402A and comment k, interpreted as denying 
strict liability for unknowable generic risks, nor Beshada, forthrightly 
permitting recovery in such cases, presents a satisfactory resolution to 
the problem. The proposed federal Product Liability Act uncritically 
accepts comment k, 165 while Beshada has provoked an outpouring of 
criticism. 166 The tide at the moment apparently is running against 
strict liability in generic-risk cases. But the last words have not yet 
been spoken. 
11·3 See note 14 supra. 
104 SeeS. Rep. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-10 (1982). 
""' SeeS. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(c), 129 Cong. Rec. 5285 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983): 
A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation if the harm was caused 
by an unavoidably dangerous aspect of a product. As used in this paragraph, an "unavoid-
ably dangerous aspect" means that aspect of a product which could not, in light of 
knowledge which was reasonably accepted in the scientific, technical, or medical commu-
nity at the time of manufacture, have been eliminated without seriously impairing the 
effectiveness with which the product performs its intended function or the desirability, 
economic and otherwise, of the product to the person who uses or consumes it. 
See also S. Rep. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982) (accompanying S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 128 Cong. Rec. S6846 (daily ed. June 16, 1982), a bill with a section virtually identical to 
this section of S. 44). 
1
''' See Schwartz, supra note 111, at 824-25; Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to \\Tarn: Two 
Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 892,901-05 (1983); 
Wade, supra note 99, at 738-39, 744; Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of 
Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71 Geo. L.J. 1635 (1983); Birnbaum & Wrubel, 
N.J. High Court Blazes New Path in Holding a Manufacturer Liable, Nat'! L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, 
at 24. col. 1; Platt & Platt, Moving from Strict to "Absolute" Liability, Nat'! L.J., Jan. 17, 1983, 
at 18, col. 3. 
For a defense of Be~hada by the attorneys for the plaintiffs in the case, see Placitella & 
Darnell, Bcslwda v. fohns-Manville Product~ Corp.: Evolution or Revolution in Strict Products 
Liability?, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 801 (1983). 
